Andrew Inkpin
- Published in print:
- 2016
- Published Online:
- January 2018
- ISBN:
- 9780262033916
- eISBN:
- 9780262333955
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262033916.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book examines the disclosive function of language—what language does in revealing or disclosing the world. It takes a phenomenological approach to this question, defined by the need to accord ...
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This book examines the disclosive function of language—what language does in revealing or disclosing the world. It takes a phenomenological approach to this question, defined by the need to accord with the various experiences speakers can have of language. Based on this commitment, it develops a phenomenological conception of language with important implications for both the philosophy of language and recent work in the embodied-embedded-enactive-extended (4e) tradition of cognitive science. The book draws extensively on the work of Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, showing how their respective conceptions of language can be combined to complement each other within a unified view. From the early Heidegger, it extracts a basic framework for a phenomenology of language, comprising both a general overall picture of the role of language and a more specific model of the disclosive function of words. Merleau-Ponty’s views are used to explicate the generic “pointing out”—or presentational—function of linguistic signs in more detail, while the late Wittgenstein is interpreted as providing versatile means to describe their many pragmatic uses. Having developed this unified phenomenological view, the book then explores its broader significance, arguing that it goes beyond the conventional realism/idealism opposition, that it challenges standard assumptions in mainstream post-Fregean philosophy of language, and that it makes a significant contribution not only to the philosophical understanding of language but also to 4e cognitive science.Less
This book examines the disclosive function of language—what language does in revealing or disclosing the world. It takes a phenomenological approach to this question, defined by the need to accord with the various experiences speakers can have of language. Based on this commitment, it develops a phenomenological conception of language with important implications for both the philosophy of language and recent work in the embodied-embedded-enactive-extended (4e) tradition of cognitive science. The book draws extensively on the work of Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, showing how their respective conceptions of language can be combined to complement each other within a unified view. From the early Heidegger, it extracts a basic framework for a phenomenology of language, comprising both a general overall picture of the role of language and a more specific model of the disclosive function of words. Merleau-Ponty’s views are used to explicate the generic “pointing out”—or presentational—function of linguistic signs in more detail, while the late Wittgenstein is interpreted as providing versatile means to describe their many pragmatic uses. Having developed this unified phenomenological view, the book then explores its broader significance, arguing that it goes beyond the conventional realism/idealism opposition, that it challenges standard assumptions in mainstream post-Fregean philosophy of language, and that it makes a significant contribution not only to the philosophical understanding of language but also to 4e cognitive science.
Chad Engelland
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- May 2015
- ISBN:
- 9780262028097
- eISBN:
- 9780262320610
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028097.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Philosophy of Language
This book focuses on the significance of ostension in first word learning, which it distinguishes from ostensive definition. It begins by discussing ostension in contemporary philosophy, especially ...
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This book focuses on the significance of ostension in first word learning, which it distinguishes from ostensive definition. It begins by discussing ostension in contemporary philosophy, especially in the work of Quine, Davidson, and Gadamer. It explores relevant empirical findings in psychology, evolutionary anthropology, and neuroscience. It offers original studies of four representative historical thinkers whose work enriches the understanding of ostension: Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Augustine, and Aristotle. Building on these philosophical and empirical foundations, the book offers a meticulous analysis of the philosophical issues raised by ostension. First, it examines the phenomenological problem of whether embodied intentions are manifest or inferred, and it argues that they are manifest in bodily movement. Second, it focuses on the problem concerning which concept of mind allows ostensive cues to be intersubjectively available, and it argues that the mirroring of animate minds, on display in animate movement, makes ostensive acts possible. Third, it examines the epistemological problem of how ostensive cues, notoriously ambiguous, can be correctly understood, and it argues that human nature and perception provide natural constraints on that ambiguity. Fourth, it examines the metaphysical problem of the ultimate status of the key terms in the argument: animate movement, language, and mind. It argues for the centrality of manifestation, which cannot be reduced to physical motion, for making sense of ourselves, our speech, and our thought. The book argues that taking ostension seriously has far-reaching implications for thinking about language and the practice of philosophy.Less
This book focuses on the significance of ostension in first word learning, which it distinguishes from ostensive definition. It begins by discussing ostension in contemporary philosophy, especially in the work of Quine, Davidson, and Gadamer. It explores relevant empirical findings in psychology, evolutionary anthropology, and neuroscience. It offers original studies of four representative historical thinkers whose work enriches the understanding of ostension: Wittgenstein, Merleau-Ponty, Augustine, and Aristotle. Building on these philosophical and empirical foundations, the book offers a meticulous analysis of the philosophical issues raised by ostension. First, it examines the phenomenological problem of whether embodied intentions are manifest or inferred, and it argues that they are manifest in bodily movement. Second, it focuses on the problem concerning which concept of mind allows ostensive cues to be intersubjectively available, and it argues that the mirroring of animate minds, on display in animate movement, makes ostensive acts possible. Third, it examines the epistemological problem of how ostensive cues, notoriously ambiguous, can be correctly understood, and it argues that human nature and perception provide natural constraints on that ambiguity. Fourth, it examines the metaphysical problem of the ultimate status of the key terms in the argument: animate movement, language, and mind. It argues for the centrality of manifestation, which cannot be reduced to physical motion, for making sense of ourselves, our speech, and our thought. The book argues that taking ostension seriously has far-reaching implications for thinking about language and the practice of philosophy.