Bruce N. Waller
- Published in print:
- 2011
- Published Online:
- August 2013
- ISBN:
- 9780262016599
- eISBN:
- 9780262298940
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262016599.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This book launches a spirited attack on a system that is profoundly entrenched in our society and its institutions, deeply rooted in our emotions, and vigorously defended by philosophers from ancient ...
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This book launches a spirited attack on a system that is profoundly entrenched in our society and its institutions, deeply rooted in our emotions, and vigorously defended by philosophers from ancient times to the present. The book argues that, despite the creative defenses of it by contemporary thinkers, moral responsibility cannot survive in our naturalistic-scientific system. The scientific understanding of human behavior and the causes that shape human character, it contends, leaves no room for moral responsibility. The book argues that moral responsibility in all its forms—including criminal justice, distributive justice, and all claims of just deserts—is fundamentally unfair and harmful and that its abolition will be liberating and beneficial. What we really want—natural human free will, moral judgments, meaningful human relationships, creative abilities—would survive and flourish without moral responsibility. In the course of this argument, the book examines the origins of the basic belief in moral responsibility, proposes a naturalistic understanding of free will, offers a detailed argument against moral responsibility and critiques arguments in favor of it, gives a general account of what a world without moral responsibility would look like, and examines the social and psychological aspects of abolishing moral responsibility. It not only mounts a vigorous attack on the moral responsibility system, but also celebrates the benefits that would result from its total abolition.Less
This book launches a spirited attack on a system that is profoundly entrenched in our society and its institutions, deeply rooted in our emotions, and vigorously defended by philosophers from ancient times to the present. The book argues that, despite the creative defenses of it by contemporary thinkers, moral responsibility cannot survive in our naturalistic-scientific system. The scientific understanding of human behavior and the causes that shape human character, it contends, leaves no room for moral responsibility. The book argues that moral responsibility in all its forms—including criminal justice, distributive justice, and all claims of just deserts—is fundamentally unfair and harmful and that its abolition will be liberating and beneficial. What we really want—natural human free will, moral judgments, meaningful human relationships, creative abilities—would survive and flourish without moral responsibility. In the course of this argument, the book examines the origins of the basic belief in moral responsibility, proposes a naturalistic understanding of free will, offers a detailed argument against moral responsibility and critiques arguments in favor of it, gives a general account of what a world without moral responsibility would look like, and examines the social and psychological aspects of abolishing moral responsibility. It not only mounts a vigorous attack on the moral responsibility system, but also celebrates the benefits that would result from its total abolition.
Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262029346
- eISBN:
- 9780262330213
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them ...
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In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which one denies ownership of a limb). Another essay argues that various attempts to explain away such anomalies within subjective theories of consciousness fail. Other essays consider such topics as the application of a model of unified consciousness to cases of brain bisection and dissociative identity disorder; prefrontal and parietal underconnectivity in autism and other psychopathologies; self-deception and the self-model theory of subjectivity; schizophrenia and the vehicle theory of consciousness; and a shift in emphasis away from an internal (or brainbound) approach to psychopathology to an interactive one. Each essay offers a distinctive perspective from the intersection of philosophy, consciousness research, and psychiatry.Less
In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which one denies ownership of a limb). Another essay argues that various attempts to explain away such anomalies within subjective theories of consciousness fail. Other essays consider such topics as the application of a model of unified consciousness to cases of brain bisection and dissociative identity disorder; prefrontal and parietal underconnectivity in autism and other psychopathologies; self-deception and the self-model theory of subjectivity; schizophrenia and the vehicle theory of consciousness; and a shift in emphasis away from an internal (or brainbound) approach to psychopathology to an interactive one. Each essay offers a distinctive perspective from the intersection of philosophy, consciousness research, and psychiatry.
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.)
- Published in print:
- 2014
- Published Online:
- September 2014
- ISBN:
- 9780262026680
- eISBN:
- 9780262321488
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
This collection of original essays, comments, and replies brings together philosophers and scientists to discuss the relevance of recent neuroscience and psychology to traditional debates about free ...
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This collection of original essays, comments, and replies brings together philosophers and scientists to discuss the relevance of recent neuroscience and psychology to traditional debates about free will and moral responsibility. These prominent authors clearly show that free will and moral responsibility raise many issues that need to be distinguished, and none of them can be addressed adequately without both philosophy and science. Various chapters concern whether free will requires rationality, whether responsibility is fundamentally social, whether the origins of actions in the brain depend on stochastic processes, whether mental states can cause bodily movements, whether free will requires dualism, whether control is enough by itself for responsibility, whether addicts and monkeys have free will, and how social groups shape people's views on free will and moral responsibility. These lively exchanges among well-known experts are a model of fruitful interdisciplinary exchange. This collection will be useful in undergraduate and graduate classes and will interest anyone who is intellectually curious.Less
This collection of original essays, comments, and replies brings together philosophers and scientists to discuss the relevance of recent neuroscience and psychology to traditional debates about free will and moral responsibility. These prominent authors clearly show that free will and moral responsibility raise many issues that need to be distinguished, and none of them can be addressed adequately without both philosophy and science. Various chapters concern whether free will requires rationality, whether responsibility is fundamentally social, whether the origins of actions in the brain depend on stochastic processes, whether mental states can cause bodily movements, whether free will requires dualism, whether control is enough by itself for responsibility, whether addicts and monkeys have free will, and how social groups shape people's views on free will and moral responsibility. These lively exchanges among well-known experts are a model of fruitful interdisciplinary exchange. This collection will be useful in undergraduate and graduate classes and will interest anyone who is intellectually curious.
Bruce N. Waller
- Published in print:
- 2015
- Published Online:
- May 2016
- ISBN:
- 9780262028165
- eISBN:
- 9780262327404
- Item type:
- book
- Publisher:
- The MIT Press
- DOI:
- 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028165.001.0001
- Subject:
- Philosophy, Moral Philosophy
Belief in moral responsibility is very strong; and although there are many arguments in support of moral responsibility, it is clear that those arguments are not as strong as the belief in moral ...
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Belief in moral responsibility is very strong; and although there are many arguments in support of moral responsibility, it is clear that those arguments are not as strong as the belief in moral responsibility, and other forces must be supporting that strong belief. The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility examines the various forces that hold the moral responsibility system in place, both in philosophy and in criminal justice. The major elements of the moral responsibility system include belief in a just world, belief in rugged individualism (and self-making), and belief that moral responsibility protects human dignity. Together, those factors block deeper inquiry into the causes of character and behavior, and the insistence on limiting deeper inquiry is fundamental to preserving belief in moral responsibility. The neoliberal culture promotes strong belief in a just world (including belief in a just economic system) as well as belief in the “self-made man,” and that culture is also the most deeply committed to individual moral responsibility.Less
Belief in moral responsibility is very strong; and although there are many arguments in support of moral responsibility, it is clear that those arguments are not as strong as the belief in moral responsibility, and other forces must be supporting that strong belief. The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility examines the various forces that hold the moral responsibility system in place, both in philosophy and in criminal justice. The major elements of the moral responsibility system include belief in a just world, belief in rugged individualism (and self-making), and belief that moral responsibility protects human dignity. Together, those factors block deeper inquiry into the causes of character and behavior, and the insistence on limiting deeper inquiry is fundamental to preserving belief in moral responsibility. The neoliberal culture promotes strong belief in a just world (including belief in a just economic system) as well as belief in the “self-made man,” and that culture is also the most deeply committed to individual moral responsibility.
Access Contested
Action Science
Action, Ethics, and Responsibility
Actual Causality
Adaptive Governance
Addiction and Responsibility
Adopting Open Source Software
Aesthetic Animism
Against Facts
