This book is primarily aimed at showing that “the phenomenal-concept strategy” for defending materialism is a flawed strategy. This strategy posits that we are possessors of a range of concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences—concepts very different in how they function from concepts applied elsewhere. These concepts permit us to think of our experiences in a first-person, subjective way even though the aspects of our experiences about which we so think are, in reality, purely material or physical entities. It is argued here, however, that phenomenal concepts, as materialists typically suppose them to be, simply do not exist. There is nothing inherently special about the concepts whereby we form a conception of what it is like for us subjectively.
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