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Consciousness RevisitedMaterialism without Phenomenal Concepts$
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Michael Tye

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262012737

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.001.0001

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Phenomenal Consciousness

Phenomenal Consciousness

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Phenomenal Consciousness
Source:
Consciousness Revisited
Author(s):

Michael Tye

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.003.0002

This chapter goes to the very heart of the mind-body problem—the question regarding the nature of consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness), in particular, is what makes this problem a deeply perplexing one because it cannot be reductively defined. According to Ned Block, one way of pointing properly to P-consciousness is through the use of rough synonyms, “Moving from synonyms to examples, we have P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste, and have pains. P-conscious properties include the experiential properties of sensations, feelings and perceptions, but I would also include thoughts, wants and emotions.” Many philosophers conceive P-consciousness as the experience of an experience, with experiences and feelings being inherently conscious states. The question remains, however, if the state of suddenly remembering something is an experience of suddenly remembering something.

Keywords:   mind-body problem, nature of consciousness, phenomenal consciousness, P-consciousness, Ned Block, rough synonyms, experiential properties, experience of an experience

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