This chapter goes to the very heart of the mind-body problem—the question regarding the nature of consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness (P-consciousness), in particular, is what makes this problem a deeply perplexing one because it cannot be reductively defined. According to Ned Block, one way of pointing properly to P-consciousness is through the use of rough synonyms, “Moving from synonyms to examples, we have P-conscious states when we see, hear, smell, taste, and have pains. P-conscious properties include the experiential properties of sensations, feelings and perceptions, but I would also include thoughts, wants and emotions.” Many philosophers conceive P-consciousness as the experience of an experience, with experiences and feelings being inherently conscious states. The question remains, however, if the state of suddenly remembering something is an experience of suddenly remembering something.
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