- Title Pages
- 1 Contracts and Investment in Natural Resources
- 2 Petroleum Contracts: What Does Contract Theory Tell Us?
- 3 Sovereign Theft: Theory and Evidence about Sovereign Default and Expropriation
- Commentary: Expropriations, Defaults, and Financial Architecture
- 4 A Resource Belief Curse? Oil and Individualism
- 5 Optimal Resource Extraction Contracts under Threat of Expropriation
- 6 Denying the Temptation to GRAB
- 7 Dealing with Expropriations: General Guidelines for Oil Production Contracts
- 8 Pricing Expropriation Risk in Natural Resource Contracts: A Real Options Approach
- 9 Credibility, Commitment, and Regulation: Ex Ante Price Caps and Ex Post Interventions
- 10 Hydrocarbon Policy, Shocks, and the Collective Imagination: What Went Wrong in Bolivia?
- 11 Urgency and Betrayal: Three Attempts to Foster Private Investment in Argentina’s Oil Industry
- 12 The Political Economy of Oil Contract Renegotiation in Venezuela
- Commentary: Not Just a Distributional Matter
- Epilogue: Populism and Natural Resources Workshop November 1–2, 2007
- Appendix: Populism and Natural Resources Workshop
- The Natural Resources Trap
- The MIT Press
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