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The Extended Mind$
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Richard Menary

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014038

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.001.0001

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The Extended Mind, the Concept of Belief, and Epistemic Credit

The Extended Mind, the Concept of Belief, and Epistemic Credit

Chapter:
(p.354) (p.355) 15 The Extended Mind, the Concept of Belief, and Epistemic Credit
Source:
The Extended Mind
Author(s):

John Preston

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0015

This chapter poses a challenge to the extended mind thesis that Andy Clark and David Chalmers propose for beliefs, upon which their thesis is largely based. Clark and Chalmers present two related theses in their exposition of the extended mind. First they present “active externalism,” which states that a cognitive system is achieved when humans are appropriately linked with external entities; second, they present “the extended mind thesis,” which states that some, if not all, of a subject’s mental phenomena are constituted partly by features of that subject’s environment. The second view is the focus of this chapter, as it is the reasoning behind the notion that beliefs can be constituted partly by features of the environment, and that the mind therefore extends into the world. Arguments in this chapter are confined to beliefs and do not include other mental phenomena.

Keywords:   extended mind thesis, Andy Clark, David Chalmers, active externalism, cognitive system, mental phenomena, beliefs

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