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The Extended Mind$
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Richard Menary

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014038

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.001.0001

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Defending the Bounds of Cognition

Defending the Bounds of Cognition

Chapter:
(p.67) 4 Defending the Bounds of Cognition
Source:
The Extended Mind
Author(s):

Fred Adams

Ken Aizawa

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0004

This chapter discusses the flaws of Clark’s extended mind hypothesis. Clark’s hypothesis assumes that the nature of the processes internal to an object has nothing to do with whether that object carries out cognitive processing. The only condition required is that the object is coupled with a cognitive agent and interacts with it in a certain way. In making this tenuous connection, Clark commits the most common mistake extended mind theorists make; alleging that an object becomes cognitive once it is connected to a cognitive agent is a “coupling-constitution fallacy.” From this fallacy, many hastily proceed to the conclusion that the object or process constitutes part of the agent’s cognitive apparatus or cognitive processing.

Keywords:   extended mind hypothesis, cognitive processing, cognitive agent, extended mind theorists, coupling-constitution fallacy, cognitive apparatus

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