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Knowledge and Skepticism$
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Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke, and Harry S. Silverstein

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014083

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014083.001.0001

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Introduction: Framing Knowledge and Skepticism

Introduction: Framing Knowledge and Skepticism

Chapter:
(p.1) Introduction: Framing Knowledge and Skepticism
Source:
Knowledge and Skepticism
Author(s):

Joseph Keim Campbell

Michael O’Rourke

Harry S. Silverstein

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014083.003.0001

The first few chapters of this book concern the intrinsic and extrinsic nature of knowledge. Here David Hemp provides a defense of Dretske’s claim that when knowledge is based on evidence, this evidence must be conclusive. He discusses a variety of puzzles about knowledge as well as some notable contextualist solutions to them. The second set of chapters specifically concerns the prospects for contextualism, wherein Duncan Pritchard marshals a linguistic defense of the invariantist use of WAMs against DeRose’s challenge. In particular, he contends that the invariantist can identify a WAM that meets DeRose’s three pragmatic conditions. Finally, the last set of chapters pushes procedural knowledge into the background and focuses on propositional knowledge. In particular, knowledge is carved according to its causal modes, specifically perception, introspection, and reason.

Keywords:   knowledge, David Hemp, Dretske, contextualism, Duncan Pritchard, invariantist, WAM, DeRose, procedural knowledge, propositional knowledge

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