The main topic of this chapter is epistemic justification, which is distinct from moral or practical justification. Paradigm cases of epistemically justified belief include belief based on good inferences, belief in self-evident truths, and belief based on perceptual representations or immediate introspective awareness. Justification is the property that makes a belief justified. The goal here is to carve a good deal of the debate about justification at its joints. The concept of justification is an important epistemic concept in its own right, and much work in epistemology has been devoted to its analysis. The present discussion advances that endeavor via four avenues. The first offers a new taxonomy of theories of justification, the second elaborates on the four positions in the new taxonomy, the third makes some points of comparison between the two taxonomies, and the fourth briefly discusses evidence for theory-choice.
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