Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Causing Human ActionsNew Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jesús H. Aguilar and Andrei A. Buckareff

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014564

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014564.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use (for details see http://www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 18 December 2017

Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for Action: The Case of Con-Reasons

Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for Action: The Case of Con-Reasons

Chapter:
(p.166) (p.167) 12 Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for Action: The Case of Con-Reasons
Source:
Causing Human Actions
Author(s):

Ruben David-Hillel

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262014564.003.0092

This chapter begins by making a distinction between causation and causal explanation; the concept of causalism utilized here refers to the former, which states that one of the causal conditions of an action is an agent’s possession of a reason for that action. Of course, it is also possible for an agent to have a reason for an action without its being a cause of that action. However, in the case in which the agent performs the action because of that reason, causalism states that the reason causes the action. In the case of causal explanations, it is possible for true causal statements to exist even if the cause is not explanatory of its effect because of the description of the cause in that statement. In fact, there might even be causes such that, under no description of the cause, does the cause explain its effect. For the purposes of the discussion here, these possibilities are disregarded.

Keywords:   causation, causal explanation, causalism, causal conditions, true causal statements

MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.