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Majority Judgment
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Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing

Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki

Abstract

This book argues that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, judge, or rank. It finds that the traditional model—transforming the “preference lists” of individuals into a “preference list” of society—is fundamentally flawed in both theory and practice. The authors propose a different model, which leads to a new theory and method: majority judgment. Majority judgment is meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty, and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice, notably Condorcet’s paradox and ... More

Keywords: social choice, preference lists, Condorcet’s paradox, Arrow’s paradox, theoretical evidence, practical evidence, experimental evidence, national elections, individual rankings, collective evaluation

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2011 Print ISBN-13: 9780262015134
Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013 DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262015134.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Michel Balinski, author

Rida Laraki, author