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Laws, Mind, and Free Will$
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Steven Horst

Print publication date: 2011

Print ISBN-13: 9780262015257

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015257.001.0001

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The Received Solution in Computational Psychology

The Received Solution in Computational Psychology

(p.27) 3 The Received Solution in Computational Psychology
Laws, Mind, and Free Will

Steven Horst

The MIT Press

This chapter discusses the received solution (RS), advocated by Fodor and other proponents of functionalism and the computer metaphor, which seeks to show that the contrast between the laws of physics and those of psychology need not imperil either the status of psychological laws or the legitimacy of psychological kinds. The core of the RS is that psychological kinds are functional kinds which are multiply realizable in different kinds of physical media. Although this view is almost always presented at an abstract level, the chapter attempts to show that it gains even greater plausibility when applied to concrete examples. RS also accepts that there is a difference between the ceteris paribus laws of psychology and the strict and exceptionless laws of physics, and that genuine natural kinds are those to which laws apply.

Keywords:   received solution, RS, Fodor, functionalism, computer metaphor, psychological laws, psychological kinds, functional kinds

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