The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts
The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts
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Abstract
Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. This book aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal consciousness, concept acquisition, and what the book calls the HOT-brain thesis. It defends and further develops a metapsychological reductive representational theory of consciousness and applies it to several importantly related problems. The book proposes a version of the HOT theory of consciousness that the text calls the “wide intrinsicality view” and shows why it is superior to various alternatives, such as self-representationalism and first-order representationalism. HOT theory says that what makes a mental state conscious is that a suitable higher-order thought is directed at that mental state. Thus it argues for an overall philosophical theory of consciousness while applying it to other significant issues not usually addressed in the philosophical literature on consciousness. Most cognitive science and empirical works on such topics as concepts and animal consciousness do not address central philosophical theories of consciousness. The book’s integration of empirical and philosophical concerns will make its argument of interest to both philosophers and nonphilosophers.
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Front Matter
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1
Introduction
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2
In Defense of the HOT Thesis
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3
Assessing Three Close Rivals
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4
From HOT Theory to the Wide Intrinsicality View
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5
Against Self-Representationalism
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6
In Defense of Conceptualism
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7
Concept Acquisition and Infant Consciousness
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8
Animal Consciousness
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9
Into the Brain
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End Matter
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