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The EnvironmentPhilosophy, Science, and Ethics$
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William P. Kabasenche, Michael O'Rourke, and Matthew H. Slater

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780262017404

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262017404.001.0001

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Can We—and Should We—Make Reparation to “Nature”?

Can We—and Should We—Make Reparation to “Nature”?

Chapter:
(p.201) 12 Can We—and Should We—Make Reparation to “Nature”?
Source:
The Environment
Author(s):

Clare Palmer

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262017404.003.0012

This chapter examines arguments for the reparation to nature in an effort to determine the possibility of any form of reparation extending beyond the human sphere. How some arguments might work and what difficulties these arguments will face are discussed in this chapter, with the aim of developing a tentative reparation argument in the context of animals. It must first be clarified, however, that the term “reparation” is used here in a moral sense and not a legal one. This is not to say that restitutive justice is any less significant; in this discussion, though, legal questions are not addressed. Whereas restitutive justice means returning exactly what was lost, or providing comparable financial compensation, reparation leaves open what form “making good” might take. It will be useful to keep the range of reparative tools as broad as possible.

Keywords:   reparation to nature, tentative reparation argument, restitutive justice, making good, moral sense

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