This chapter lays out the options for those who plan to fall back on perception, invoking this strategy to preserve Content Involving Cognition (CIC). In particular, it reveals why adopting a hyperintellectualist position is of no avail. Apart from assuming that perceptual experience is inherently contentful, hyperintellectualists also assume that it depends on a great deal of background representational activity. These latter commitments inherit the problems of the discredited CIC accounts—those examined and dismissed in Chapter 4. Nevertheless, all of the commitments that make hyperintellectualism “hyper” can be rejected in favor of a minimal intellectualism—one that skirts the crippling Hard Problem of Content while remaining a solid CIC proposal about perceptual experience. The chapter considers how those who want to defend CIC in this domain might go even lower, adopting maximally minimal intellectualism—the most modest and credible CIC view of how perceptual experience might be essentially contentfully representational.
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