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Radicalizing EnactivismBasic Minds without Content$
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Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin

Print publication date: 2012

Print ISBN-13: 9780262018548

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262018548.001.0001

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Regaining Consciousness

Regaining Consciousness

Chapter:
(p.154) (p.155) 8 Regaining Consciousness
Source:
Radicalizing Enactivism
Author(s):

Daniel D. Hutto

Erik Myin

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262018548.003.0008

This chapter considers the implications of Radical Enactive Cognition for thinking about phenomenal consciousness. Does REC imply the conclusions about the extent of phenomenality that many enactivists argue for? Is there any compelling reason to suppose that phenomenality is extensive? The answers are complex. The chapter attempts to correct some confusions about the exact value of the enactivist strategy of going wide, and looks to environmental features when explaining why the phenomenal characters of experiences are as they are.

Keywords:   Radical Enactive Cognition, phenomenal consciousness, phenomenality, enactivist strategy, experiences

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