Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Our Own MindsSociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness$

Radu J. Bogdan

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262026376

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026376.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use (for details see www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: null; date: 21 January 2019

(p.194) (p.195) References

(p.194) (p.195) References

Source:
Our Own Minds
Publisher:
The MIT Press

Bibliography references:

Adamson, L. B. 1995. Communication Development During Infancy. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Armstrong, D. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. New York: Humanities Press.

Astington, J. W., and A. Gopnik. 1988. Knowing you’ve changed your mind: children’s understanding of representational change. In Developing Theories of Mind, ed. J. W. Astington, P. L. Harris, and D. Olson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Astington, J. W., P. L. Harris, and D. Olson, eds. 1988. Developing Theories of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baars, B. J. 1988. A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baron-Cohen, S. 1995. Mindblindness. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Baron-Cohen, S., and H. Ring. 1994. A model of the mindreading system. In Children’s Early Understanding of Mind, ed. C. Lewis and P. Mitchell. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Barresi, J., and C. Moore. 1996. Intentional relations and social understanding. Behavioral & Brain Sciences 19:107–122.

Bates, E. 1976. Language and Context. New York: Academic Press.

Behrmann, M., M. Moscovich, and G. Winocur. 1994. Intact visual imagery and impaired visual perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology 20:1068–1087.

Bermudez, J. 1998. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Bermudez, J. 2003. Thoughts Without Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Berthoz, A., and J.-L. Petit. 2006. Phénomenologie et Physiologie de l’Action. Paris: Éditions Odile Jacob.

(p.196) Bertolo, H., T. Paiva, L. Pessoa, T. Mestre, R. Marques, and R. Santos. 2003. Visual dream content, graphical representation and EEg alpha activity in congenitally blind subjects. Cognitive Brain Research 15:277–284.

Bjorklund, D. F. 2005. Children’s Thinking. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth.

Bjorklund, D. F., and A. Pellegrini. 2002. The Origins of Human Nature. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.

Block, N. 1995. On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral & Brain Sciences 18:227–247.

Block, N., O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere, eds. 1997. The Nature of Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Bloom, P. 2000. How Children Learn the Meanings of Words. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Bloom, P. 2004. Descartes’ Baby. New York: Basic Books.

Bogdan, R. J. 1993. The architectural nonchalance of commonsense psychology. Mind & Language 8:189–205.

Bogdan, R. J. 1994. Grounds for Cognition. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Bogdan, R. J. 1997. Interpreting Minds. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Bogdan, R. J. 2000. Minding Minds. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Bogdan, R. J. 2003. Watch your metastep: the first-order limits of early intentional attributions. In Persons, ed. C. Kanzian et al. Vienna: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.

Bogdan, R. J. 2005a. Pretending as imaginative rehearsal for cultural conformity. Journal of Cognition and Culture 5:191–213.

Bogdan, R. J. 2005b. Why self-ascriptions are difficult and develop late. In Other Minds, ed. B. Malle and S. Hodges. New York: Guilford Press.

Bogdan, R. J. 2007. Inside loops. Synthese 159:235–252.

Bogdan, R. J. 2009. Predicative Minds. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Boyd, R., and J. Silk. 1997. How Humans Evolve. New York: Norton.

Brownell, H., R. Griffin, E. Winner, O. Friedman, and F. Happé. 2000. Cerebral lateralization and theory of mind. In Understanding Other Minds. 2nd ed., ed. S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, and D. J. Cohen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bruner, J. 1983. Child’s Talk. New York: Norton.

Bruner, J., and C. Feldman. 1993. Theories of mind and the problem of autism. In Understanding Other Minds, ed. S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, and D. J. Cohen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

(p.197) Butterworth, G. 1991. The ontogeny and phylogeny of joint visual attention. In Natural Theories of Mind, ed. A. Whiten. Oxford: Blackwell.

Byrne, R. W., and A. Whiten, eds. 1988. Machiavellian Intelligence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carey, S. 1985. Conceptual Change in Childhood. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Carey, S., and E. Spelke. 1994. Domain-specific knowledge and conceptual change. In Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture, ed. L. A. Hirschfeld and S. A. Gelman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carruthers, P. 1996. Language, Thought and Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carruthers, P. 2002. Human creativity: its cognitive basis, its evolution, and its connections with childhood pretence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53:225–249.

Carruthers, P. 2005. Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chandler, M. J. 1988. Doubt and developing theories of mind. In Developing Theories of Mind, ed. J. W. Astington et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chartrand, T. L., and J. A. Bargh. 1999. The chameleon effect: the perception-behavior link and social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76:893–910.

Churchland, P. 1979. Scientiifc Realism and the Plasticityy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Clayton, N., et al. 2002. Elements of episodic-like memory in animals. In Episodic Memory, ed. A. Baddeley et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clements, W., and J. Perner. 1994. Implicit understanding of belief. Cognitive Development 9:377–397.

Conway, M. 2002. Sensory-perceptual memory and its context: autobiographical memory. In Episodic Memory, ed. A. Baddeley et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Corcoran, R. 2000. Theory of mind in other clinical conditions. In Understanding Other Minds. 2nd ed., ed. S. Baron-Cohen et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cosmides, L., and J. Tooby. 2000. Consider the source: the evolution of adaptations for decoupling and metarepresentations. In Metarepresentations, ed. D. Sperber. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Currie, G., and I. Ravenscroft. 2002. Recreative Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Damasio, A. 1999. The Feeling of What Happens. New York: Harcourt.

(p.198) Davidson, D. 1984. Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Davidson, D. 2003. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dawkins, R. 1976. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Decety, J., M. Jeannerod, and C. Prablanc. 1989. The timing of mentally represented actions. Behavioural Brain Research 34:35–42.

Dehaene, S., J.-P. Changeux, L. Naccache, J. Sackur, and C. Sergent. 2006. Conscious, subconscious and subliminal processing. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10:204–211.

Dehaene, S., and L. Naccache. 2001. Toward a neuroscience of consciousness. In The Cognitive Neuroscience of Consciousness, ed. S. Dehaene. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Dempster, F. 1992. The rise and fall of inhibitory mechanisms. Developmental Review 12:45–75.

Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown.

De Waal, F. 1982. Chimpanzee Politics. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, A. 2001. Normal developments of prefrontal cortex from birth to young adulthood. In The Frontal Lobes, ed. D. T. Stuss and R. T. Knight. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Donald, M. 1991. Origins of the Modern Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Donald, M. 1998. Mimesis and the executive suite. In The Evolutionary Emergence of Language, ed. C. Knight, M. Studdert-Kennedy, and J. R. Hurford. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Donald, M. 2001. A Mind So Rare. New York: Norton.

Dretske, F. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Dunn, J. 1988. The Beginnings of Social Understanding. Oxford: Blackwell.

Farah, M. J. 1984. The neurological basis of mental imagery. Cognition 18:245–272.

Flavell, J. H. 2000. Development of children’s knowledge about the mental world. International Journal of Behavioral Development 24:15–23.

Flavell, J. H., F. L. Green, and E. R. Flavell. 1995. Young children’s knowledge about thinking. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 60:1–96.

Flavell, J. H., F. L. Green, and E. R. Flavell. 1998. The mind has a mind of its own. Cognitive Development 13:127–138.

(p.199) Flavell, J. H., F. L. Green, E. R. Flavell, and G. B. Grossman. 1997. The development of children’s knowledge about inner speech. Developmental Psychology 68:39–47.

Fodor, J. A. 1983. Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Fodor, J. A. 1987. Psychosemantics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Fodor, J. A. 1992. A theory of the child’s theory of mind. Cognition 44:283–296.

Foulkes, D. 1999. Children’s Dreaming and the Development of Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Frith, C. 1992. The Neurological Basis of Schizophrenia. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Frith, U. 1989. Autism. Oxford: Blackwell.

Frith, U., and C. Frith. 2003. Development and neurophysiology of mentalising. Philosophical Transactions 358:459–473.

Gallagher, S. 2005. How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gallese, V. 2000. The inner sense of action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7:23–40.

Gergely, G., H. Bekkering, and I. Kilary. 2002. Rational imitation in preverbal infants. Nature 415:755.

Gibson, J. J. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.

bookGoldman, A. 1993. The psychology of folk psychology. Behavioral & Brain Sciences 16:15–28.

Goldman, A. 2006. Simulating Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gomez, J. C. 1991. Visual behavior as a window for reading the mind of others in primates. In Natural Theories of Mind, ed. A. Whiten. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gomez, J. C. 2005. Joint attention and the sensorimotor notion of subject. In Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds, ed. N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, and J. Roessler. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gopnik, A. 1993. How we know our minds. Behavioral & Brain Sciences 16:1–14.

Gopnik, A., and A. N. Meltzoff. 1997. Words, Thoughts, and Theories. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Gopnik, A., and H. M. Wellman. 1992. Why the child’s theory of mind really is a theory. Mind & Language 7:145–171.

Gordon, R. M. 1986. Folk psychology as simulation. Mind & Language 1:158–171.

(p.200) Gordon, R. M. 1993. Self-ascriptions of belief and desire. Behavioral & Brain Sciences 16:45–46.

Gordon, R. M. 2007. Ascent routines for propositional attitudes. Synthese 159: 151–165.

Graham, G., T. Horgan and J. Tienson. 2007. Consciousness and intentionality. In The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, ed. M. Velman and S. Schneider. Oxford: Blackwell.

Grezes, J., N. Costes and J. Decety. 1998. The top-down effect of the perception of human biological motion. Cognitive Neuropsychology 15:553–582.

Grice, P. 1957. Meaning. Philosophical Review 66:377–388.

Groopman, J. 2007. Silent minds. The New Yorker (15 October): 38–43.

Grush, R. 2004. The emulation theory of representation. Behavioral & Brain Sciences 27:377–396.

Happé, F. 1994. Communicative competence and theory of mind in autism. Cognition 48:101–119.

Hare, B., J. Call, and M. Tomasello. 2001. Do chimpanzees know what conspecifics know? Animal Behaviour 61:139–151.

Harris, P. 1992. From simulation to folk psychology. Mind & Language 7:120–144.

Harris, P. 2000. The Work of Imagination. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hobson, R. P. 1993. Autism and the Development of Mind. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Houdé, O. 1995. Rationalité, Développement et Inhibition. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Humphrey, N. K. [1976] 1988. The Social Function of the Intellect. In Machiavellian Intelligence, ed. J. Byrne and A. Whiten. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hurley, S. 1999. Consciousness in Action. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Jacob, P., and M. Jeannerod. 2003. Ways of Seeing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Jeannerod, M. 1997. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Action. Oxford: Blackwell.

Jeannerod, M. 2003. Simulation of action: a unifying concept for motor cognition. In Taking Action, ed. S. Johnson-Frey. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Jeannerod, M. 2006. Motor Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. 1992. Beyond Modularity. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Kosslyn, S. 1994. Image and Brain. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

(p.201) Kosslyn, S. M., et al. 2001. Neural foundations of imagery. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience 2:635–642.

Kriegel, U. 2004. Consciousness and self-consciousness. Monist 87:185–209.

Le Bihan, D., et al. 1993. Activation of human primary visual cortex during visual recall. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 90:11802–11805.

Lehrer, K. 1997. Self-Trust. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leondar, B. 1977. Hatching plots: genesis of storymaking. In The Arts and Cognition, ed. D. Perkins and B. Leondar. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Leslie, A. M. 1988. Some implications of pretense for mechanisms underlying the child’s theory of mind. In Developing Theories of Mind, ed. J. W. Astington et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leslie, A. M. 1991. The theory of mind impairment in autism. In Natural Theories of Mind, ed. A. Whiten. Oxford: Blackwell.

Leslie, A. M. 1994. How to acquire a representational theory of mind. In Metarepresentations, ed. D. Sperber. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Leslie, A. 2000. Theory of mind as a mechanism of selective attention. In The New Cognitive Neurosciences, ed. M. Gazzaniga. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Lewis, C. 1994. Episodes, events, and narratives in the child’s understanding of mind. In Origins of an Understanding of Mind, ed. C. Lewis and P. Mitchell. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Lewis, D. 1972. Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50:249–258.

Lillard, A. 1994. Making sense of pretense. In Children’s Early Understanding of Mind, ed. C. Lewis and P. Mitchell. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Lopes da Silva, F. H. 2003. Visual dreams in the congenitally blind? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7:328–330.

Lycan, W. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Mandler, J. M., and L. McDonough. 2000. Advancing down to the basic level. Journal of Cognition and Development 1:379–403.

Mead, G. H. 1934. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McGinn, C. 1991a. Consciousness and content. In Mind and Common Sense, ed. R. J. Bogdan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McGinn, C. 1991b. The Problem of Consciousness. Oxford: Blackwell.

(p.202) Meltzoff, A. 1995. Understanding the intentions of others. Developmental Psychology 31:838–850.

Meltzoff, A., and A. Gopnik. 1993. The role of imitation in understanding persons and developing a theory of mind. In Understanding Other Minds, ed. S. Baron-Cohen et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Meltzoff, A., and G. Moore. 1977. Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates. Science 198:75–78.

Meltzoff, A., and J. Decety. 2003. What imitation tells us about social cognition. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society: Biological Sciences 358:491–500.

Metzinger, T. 2003. Being No One. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Milner, D., and M. Goodale. 1995. The Visual Brain in Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mitchell, P., U. Teucher, M. Bennett, F. Ziegler, and R. Wyton. 2009. Do children start out thinking they don’t know their own minds? Mind & Language 24:328–346.

Mitchell, R. 2002. Imaginative animals, pretending children. In Pretending and Imagination in Animals and Children, ed. R. Mitchell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mithen, S. 1996. The Prehistory of the Mind. London: Thames & Hudson.

Morin, A. 2006. Levels of consciousness and self-awareness. Consciousness and Cognition 15:359–371.

Nagel, T. 1974. What it is like to be a bat? Philosophical Review 83:435–450.

Nelkin, N. 1996. Consciousness and the Origins of Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nelson, K. 1996. Language in Cognitive Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nelson, K. 2007. Young Minds in Social Worlds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Nichols, S., and S. Stich. 2003. Mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ofen, N., et al. 2007. Development of the declarative memory system in the human brain. Nature Neuroscience 10:1198–1205.

Olson, D. 1988. On the origins of beliefs and other intentional states in children. In Developing Theories of Mind, ed. J. W. Astington et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olson, D. 1989. Making up your mind. Canadian Psychology 30:617–627.

(p.203) Olson, D., and D. Kamawar. 1999. The theory of scriptions. In Developing Theories of Intention, ed. P. D. Zelazo, J. W. Astington, and D. R. Olson. Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Onishi, K. H., and R. Baillargeon. 2005. Do 15-months-old infants understand false beliefs? Science 308:255–258.

Perner, J. 1991. Understanding the Representational Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Perner, J. 2000. Memory and theory of mind. In The Oxford Handbook of Memory, ed. E. Tulving et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Piaget, J. 1964. Six études de psychologie. Geneva: Éditions Gonthier.

Piaget, J. 1974. Understanding Causality. New York: Norton.

Poulet, J. F. A., and B. Hedwig. 2006. New insights into corollary discharges mediated by identified neural pathways. Trends in Neurosciences 30:14–21.

Povinelli, D. 1996. Chimpanzee theory of mind?: the long road to strong inference. In Theories of Theories of Mind, ed. P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Presss.

Prinz, J. J. 2004. The fractionation of introspection. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7–8:40–57.

Prinz, W. 1990. A common coding approach to perception and action. In Relationships between Perception and Action, ed. O. Neumann and W. Prinz. Berlin: Springer, 167–201.

Quine, W. V. O. 1960. Word and Object. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Rogoff, B. 1990. Apprenticeship in Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rosenthal, D. 2005. Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rizzolatti, G., L. Fadiga, V. Gallese, and L. Fogassi. 1996. Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research 3:131–141.

Russell, J. 1996. Agency. Hove, U.K.: Erlbaum, Taylor & Francis.

Savage-Rumbaugh, S. 1991. Multi-tasking: the pan-human Rubicon. Neuroscience 3:417–422.

Searle, J. 1982. Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Searle, J. 1992. The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Sellars, W. 1956/1963. Science, Perception and Reality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

(p.204) Slobin, D. 1990. The development from child speaker to native speaker. In Cultural Psychology, ed. J. W. Stigler, R. A. Schwede, and G. Herdt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, E. E., and S. M. Kosslyn. 2007. Cognitive Psychology. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson/Prentice Hall.

Smith, J. D., W. E. Shields, and D. Washburn. 2003. The comparative psychology of uncertainty monitoring and metacognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26:317–339.

Sperry, R. W. 1950. Neural basis of the spontaneous optokinetic response produced by visual inversion. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 43:482–489.

Spivey, M., M. Tyler, D. Richardson and E. Young. 2000. Eye movements during comprehension of spoken scene descriptions. Proceedings of the 22nd annual conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 487–492. Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Stephens, G. L., and G. Graham. 2000. When Self-Consciousness Breaks. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Stich, S. 1983. From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Stone, V. 2000. The roles of the frontal lobes and amygdala in theory of mind. In Understanding Other Minds. 2nd ed., ed. S. Baron-Cohen et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, M. 1988. The development of children’s understanding of the seeing-knowing distinction. In Developing Theories of Mind, ed. J. W. Astington et al. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tomasello, M. 1999. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Tomasello, M. 2003. Constructing a Language. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Tomasello, M. 2008. The Origins of Human Communication. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Tomasello, M., and J. Call. 1997. Primate Cognition. New York: Oxford University Press.

Tomasello, M., M. Carpenter, J. Call, T. Behne, and H. Moll. 2005. Understanding and sharing intentions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28:675–735.

Trevarthen, C. 1993. The self born in intersubjectivity. In The Perceived Self, ed.U. Neisser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tye, M. 1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

(p.205) van Gulick, R. 1993. Understanding the phenomenal mind. In Consciousness, ed. M. Davies and G. Humphreys. Oxford: Blackwell.

Vogeley, K., and G. R. Fink. 2003. Neural correlates for first-person perspective. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7:38–42.

von Holst, E., and H. Mittelstaedt. 1950. Das reafferenzprinzip: wechselwirkungen zwischen zentralnervensystem und peripherie. Naturwissenschaften 37:464–476.

Vosgerau, G., and A. Newen. 2007. Thoughts, motor actions and the self. Mind & Language 22:22–43.

Vygotsky, L. S. 1934/1962. Thought and Language. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Originally published in Russian, in 1934.)

Vygotsky, L. S. 1960/1981. The genesis of higher mental functions. In The Concept of Activity in Soviet Psychology, ed. J. V. Wertsch. Armonk, Maine: Sharpe. (Originally but posthumously published in Russian, in 1960).

Wellman, H. 1990. The Child’s Theory of Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Whiten, A., and R. W. Byrne. 1991. The emergence of metarepresentation in human ontogeny and primate phylogeny. In Natural Theories of Mind, ed. A. Whiten. Oxford: Blackwell.

Wimmer, H., and J. Perner. 1983. Beliefs about beliefs. Cognition 13:103–128.

Wolpert, D., R. Miall, and M. Kawato. 1998. Internal models of the cerebellum. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2:338–347.

Young, G. 2008. On how a child’s awareness of thinking informs explanations of thought insertion. Consciousness and Cognition 17:848–862.