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Disjunctivism
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Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings

Alex Byrne and Heather Logue

Abstract

A central debate regarding perception in contemporary philosophy concerns the disjunctive theory of perceptual experience. Until the 1960s, philosophers of perception generally assumed that a veridical perception (a perceptual experience that presents the world as it really is) and a subjectively similar hallucination must have significant mental commonalities. Disjunctivists challenge this assumption, contending that the veridical perception and the corresponding hallucination share no mental core. Suppose that while you are looking at a lemon, God suddenly removes it, while keeping your brai ... More

Keywords: perception, disjunctive theory, perceptual experience, veridical perception, hallucination, disjunctivism, disjunctivists, J. M. Hinton, contemporary philosophy

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2008 Print ISBN-13: 9780262026550
Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013 DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026550.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Alex Byrne, editor

Heather Logue, editor

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