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Moral Psychology, Volume 4Free Will and Moral Responsibility$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780262026680

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.001.0001

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Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences

Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Is Free Will an Illusion? Confronting Challenges from the Modern Mind Sciences
Source:
Moral Psychology, Volume 4
Author(s):

Eddy Nahmias

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0002

Nahmias shows how different parts of science raise distinct challenges from determinism, epiphenomenalism, naturalism, and rationality. In the end, he proposes a nuanced limited-free-will view according to which we retain some free will but less than we usually think we have. Nahmias's claim that we retain even limited free will is questioned by Gunnar Björnsson and Derk Pereboom from the viewpoint of philosophy and then by Erman Misirlisoy and Patrick Haggard from the viewpoint of neuroscience. Nahmias replies by arguing that our ordinary understanding of free will does not require as much as his critics claim.

Keywords:   Free will, Responsibility, Determinism, Epiphenomenalism, Naturalism, Rationality

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