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Moral Psychology, Volume 4Free Will and Moral Responsibility$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780262026680

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.001.0001

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Mental Life and Responsibility in Real Time with a Determined Brain

Mental Life and Responsibility in Real Time with a Determined Brain

Chapter:
(p.59) 2 Mental Life and Responsibility in Real Time with a Determined Brain
Source:
Moral Psychology, Volume 4
Author(s):

Michael S. Gazzaniga

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0003

Gazzaniga defends a version of “semi-compatibilism” in which determinism is incompatible with free action and free will but is still compatible with moral responsibility, because moral responsibility is inherently social, so it does not conflict with neuroscience and physics in the way that free will does. In their commentaries, Dennett and Newsome both suggest that Gazzaniga gave up on freedom too quickly. Gazzaniga's reply introduces an analogy to robots in order to show how we can lack freedom but still be responsible in a social way.

Keywords:   Free will, Moral responsibility, Determinism, Compatibilism, Neuroscience

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