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Moral Psychology, Volume 4Free Will and Moral Responsibility$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780262026680

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.001.0001

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Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues about Free Will?

Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues about Free Will?

Chapter:
(p.103) 3 Can Neuroscience Resolve Issues about Free Will?
Source:
Moral Psychology, Volume 4
Author(s):

Adina L. Roskies

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0004

Roskies discusses an important method in neuroscience that is too often left out of free will debates: single-neuron recordings. Roskies explains classic experiments on perceptual decision making and asks whether brain processes are stochastic, but she ends up siding with compatibilism over libertarianism. In their comments, Kane defends his brand of libertarianism against Roskies's compatibilism, and Shadlen proposes further lessons from his work on perceptual decision making. In her reply, Roskies defends her compatibilism as well as her interpretation of the science.

Keywords:   Free will, Determinism, Libertarianism, Compatibilism, Perceptual decisionmaking, Stochastic processes

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