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Moral Psychology, Volume 4Free Will and Moral Responsibility$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780262026680

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.001.0001

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Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?

Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?

Chapter:
(p.195) 5 Free Will and Substance Dualism: The Real Scientific Threat to Free Will?
Source:
Moral Psychology, Volume 4
Author(s):

Alfred R. Mele

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.003.0006

Mele uses survey methods of experimental philosophy to argue that folk notions of freedom and responsibility do not really require any dubious mind–body dualism. In his comment, Nadelhoffer questions Mele's interpretation of the experiments and adds contrary data of his own. Vargas then suggests that Mele overlooks yet another threat to free will—sourcehood. Mele replies by reinterpreting Nadelhoffer's data and rejecting Vargas’ claim that free will requires sourcehood.

Keywords:   Free will, Moral responsibility, Determinism, Experimental Philosophy, Dualism, Sourcehood

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