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Moral Psychology, Volume 4Free Will and Moral Responsibility$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780262026680

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.001.0001

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Constructing a Scientific Theory of Free Will

Constructing a Scientific Theory of Free Will

(p.235) 6 Constructing a Scientific Theory of Free Will
Moral Psychology, Volume 4

Roy F. Baumeister

The MIT Press

Baumeister discusses determinism and reductionism with emphases on self-regulation and conscious and meaningful causation of behavior. Baumeister concludes that freedom exists but can only be seen by looking at the proper level of analysis. In their comments, Holton questions some of Baumeister's philosophical moves, and then Payne and Cameron suggest new psychological methods (centrally the process dissociation procedure) to better understand conscious intentions and their causal roles. Baumeister responds appreciatively but defends his claim that “rational choice deserves a role in a psychological theory of free will.”

Keywords:   Determinism, Reductionism, Free Will, Moral responsibility, Self-regulation, Consciousness

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