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Moral Psychology, Volume 4Free Will and Moral Responsibility$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780262026680

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026680.001.0001

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Agency and Control: The Subcortical Role in Good Decisions

Agency and Control: The Subcortical Role in Good Decisions

(p.309) 8 Agency and Control: The Subcortical Role in Good Decisions
Moral Psychology, Volume 4

Patricia S. Churchland

Christopher L. Suhler

The MIT Press

Churchland and Suhler argue that we can have control without responding to conscious reasons, and that control (rather than free will) is what really matters to responsibility. In their comment, Coutlee and Huettel distinguish model-free and model-based control and suggest that the kind of responsibility for model-free control might be more limited than that for model-based control. Levy then argues that consciousness is more important to responsibility than Churchland and Suhler claim. In reply, Churchland and Suhler explain how their view can be made compatible with the insights of Coutlee and Huettel as well as Levy.

Keywords:   Free will, Moral responsibility, Consciousness, Control, Subcortical

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