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Tax Systems$
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Joel Slemrod and Christian Gillitzer

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780262026727

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: May 2014

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026727.001.0001

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Standard Instruments with New Costs

Standard Instruments with New Costs

Chapter:
(p.121) 8 Standard Instruments with New Costs
Source:
Tax Systems
Author(s):

Joel Slemrod

Christian Gillitzer

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026727.003.0008

This chapter considers some examples of how introducing administrative and compliance costs modifies and enriches formal normative analysis of the standard set of tax instruments. Examples covered include commodity taxation with compliance costs, optimal commodity tax enforcement, the optimal size of a tax collection agency, optimal audit rules, and optimal redistribution when avoidance behavior is heterogeneous.

Keywords:   Audit rules, Administrative costs, Compliance costs, Enforcement

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