Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Economics of ConflictTheory and Empirical Evidence$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Karl Wärneryd

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780262026895

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2014

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262026895.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use (for details see http://www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 11 December 2017

Social Preferences of Ex-Combatants

Social Preferences of Ex-Combatants

Survey and Experimental Evidence from Postwar Tajikistan

Chapter:
(p.231) 9 Social Preferences of Ex-Combatants
Source:
The Economics of Conflict
Author(s):

Alessandra Cassar

Pauline Grosjean

Sam Whitt

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262026895.003.0010

This chapter examines the relationship between violence and pro-social behavior using unique game-behavioral and survey evidence collected in postwar Tajikistan. It shows that ex-combatants exhibit much less trust toward, and willingness to cooperate with, anonymous strangers compared to non-combatants. Thus, while violence reinforces social cohesion and cooperation along kinship and network lines, it also undermines them along other dimensions that are critical for institution building and market development, such as generalized trust and sense of fairness toward anonymous others.

Keywords:   social behavior, pro-social behavior, violence, conflict participation, trust, social cohesion, cooperation

MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.