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Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness$
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David J. Bennett and Christopher S. Hill

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780262027786

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.001.0001

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Bayesian Modeling of Perceiving:

Bayesian Modeling of Perceiving:

A Guide to Basic Principles

Chapter:
(p.3) 1 Bayesian Modeling of Perceiving
Source:
Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness
Author(s):

David J. Bennett

Julia Trommershäuser

Loes C. J. van Dam

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.003.0001

Philosophical reflection on perceptual consciousness has typically adopted a modality-specific perspective as its point of departure. According to this approach, an account of perceptual consciousness as a whole will simply fall out of an account of each of the various perceptual modalities. In this chapter, Tim Baynes argues against one manifestation of this atomistic approach to perceptual experience: the decomposition thesis. According to the decomposition thesis, a person’s overall perceptual experience can be identified with the sum of their modality-specific experiences. He examines objections to the decomposition thesis deriving from three sources: the phenomenal unity of consciousness, the existence of common sensibles, and the nature of multisensory integration, focusing in most detail on the last of these three objections.

Keywords:   Perceptual experience, Multisensory integration, Unity of consciousness, Object files, Binding, Common sensibles

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