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Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness$
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David J. Bennett and Christopher S. Hill

Print publication date: 2014

Print ISBN-13: 9780262027786

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: May 2015

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.001.0001

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A Unity Pluralist Account of the Unity of Experience

A Unity Pluralist Account of the Unity of Experience

Chapter:
(p.233) 11 A Unity Pluralist Account of the Unity of Experience
Source:
Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness
Author(s):

David J. Bennett

Christopher S. Hill

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262027786.003.0011

David J. Bennett and Christopher S. Hill begin by offering a pluralistic view of unity of consciousness, urging that there are a number of different unity-making relations that link the experiences of a subject together. Their chapter also maintains that the class of unity relations is quite diverse: some such relations are more sensory or perceptual (e.g. ‘spatial unity’), while others are more cognitive (e.g.shared ‘accessibility’). Further, while allowing that the experiences of a subject are often fully unified, it denies that this is always true. In many cases, some of the experiences of a subject are disjoint from the rest. After arguing for these claims, the chapter discusses three additional questions: (i) Can experiences properly be said to be unified simply in virtue of belonging to the same subject? (ii) What forms of unity characterize the experiences of impaired subjects, such as visual form agnosics? And (iii) what if anything do the various unity-making relations have in common? What unifies the unity-relations?

Keywords:   Unity, Consciousness, Experience, Subject, Agnosia

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