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The Myth of the IntuitiveExperimental Philosophy and Philosophical Method$
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Max Deutsch

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780262028950

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2015

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262028950.001.0001

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The Relocation Problem and Williamson on “Judgment Skepticism”

The Relocation Problem and Williamson on “Judgment Skepticism”

(p.59) 3 The Relocation Problem and Williamson on “Judgment Skepticism”
The Myth of the Intuitive

Max Deutsch

The MIT Press

This chapter assesses one of Timothy Williamson’s complaints against negative xphi, namely that it leads to an untenable form of scepticism he calls “judgment scepticism.” The result of this assessment is that negative xphi does not risk this sort of scepticism, and therefore that the question of what justifies our judgments about philosophical thought experiments, a question implicit in the negative xphi critique, is a legitimate one. The chapter also introduces a potential problem, the “Relocation Problem,” for the view of philosophical method endorsed by the book. Replies to this problem, which is, roughly, the problem of saying what justifies the premises of the arguments that philosophers give in favour of their judgments about thought experiments, are sketched.

Keywords:   Judgment scepticism, Timothy Williamson, Relocation Problem

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