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Disturbed ConsciousnessNew Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness$
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Rocco J. Gennaro

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780262029346

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: May 2016

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.001.0001

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Self-Deception and the Dolphin Model of Cognition

Self-Deception and the Dolphin Model of Cognition

Chapter:
(p.167) 7 Self-Deception and the Dolphin Model of Cognition
Source:
Disturbed Consciousness
Author(s):

Iuliia Pliushch

Thomas Metzinger

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262029346.003.0007

Julia Pliushch and Thomas Metzinger attempt to shed light on the phenomenon of self-deception using some of the conceptual tools offered by Metzinger’s self-model theory of subjectivity. They analyze a selected set of recent and well-documented empirical examples for human self-deception. They then offer a functionalist and representationalist analysis of how the integration of certain kinds of information into the currently active phenomenal self-model (PSM) can be blocked, thus precluding this information to become globally available for introspection. Due to the transparency of the conscious model of the self this deficit of self-knowledge mostly remains unnoticed by the self-deceived for certain periods of time, leading to sincere reports about its content of the currently active self-model that seem implausible from the third-person perspective. Interestingly, self-deception may be based on complex causal interactions between the transparent and the opaque layers of the human PSM. Their aim is concentrate on what we take to be the most intriguing and philosophically relevant question: How is it conceivable that systematic and robust forms of misrepresentation on the level of phenomenal self-consciousness exist and are sometimes even functionally adequate, for individual human persons as well as in an evolutionary context?

Keywords:   Self-Deception, Dolphin Model, Self-Model Theory, Transparency, Consciousness, Introspection

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