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The Bodily SelfSelected Essays$
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José Luis Bermúdez

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780262037501

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2018

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037501.001.0001

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Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness and Cognitive Science

Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness and Cognitive Science

Chapter:
(p.27) 1 Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness and Cognitive Science
Source:
The Bodily Self
Author(s):

José Luis Bermúdez

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262037501.003.0002

Taking as point of departure a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) that appears to block philosophical elucidation of self-consciousness, this paper illustrates how highly conceptual forms of self-consciousness emerge from a rich foundation of nonconceptual forms of self-awareness. Attention is paid in particular to the primitive forms of nonconceptual self-consciousness manifested in visual perception, somatic proprioception, spatial reasoning and interpersonal psychological interactions. The study of these primitive forms of self-consciousness is an interdisciplinary enterprise and the paper considers a range of points of contact where philosophical work can illuminate work in the cognitive sciences, and vice versa.

Keywords:   Self-consciousness, Nonconceptual content, Cognitive science, Proprioception, Spatial reasoning, Self-reference

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