Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Bodily SelfSelected Essays$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

José Luis Bermúdez

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780262037501

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: September 2018

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037501.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use (for details see www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 19 March 2019

Bodily Ownership, Psychological Ownership, and Psychopathology

Bodily Ownership, Psychological Ownership, and Psychopathology

Chapter:
(p.233) 9 Bodily Ownership, Psychological Ownership, and Psychopathology
Source:
The Bodily Self
Author(s):

José Luis Bermúdez

Publisher:
The MIT Press
DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262037501.003.0010

Debates about bodily ownership and psychological ownership have typically proceeded independently of each other. This paper explores the relation between them, with particular reference to how each is illuminated by psychopathology. I propose a general framework for studying ownership that is applicable both to bodily ownership (φ‎-ownership) and psychological ownership (ψ‎-ownership). The framework proposes studying ownership by starting with explicit judgments of ownership and then exploring the bases for those judgments. Section 3 discusses John Campbell’s account of ψ‎-ownership in the light of that general framework, emphasizing in particular his fractionation (inspired by schizophrenic delusions) of ψ‎-ownership into two dissociable components. Section 4 briefly presents an account of φ‎-ownership that I have developed in more detail elsewhere. Section 5 explores the suggestion, originating with Alexandre Billon, that there needs to be an integrated account of φ‎-ownership and ψ‎-ownership because depersonalization disorders typically involve breakdowns of both φ‎-ownership and ψ‎-ownership. The argument from depersonalization is not compelling, but section 6 proposes a different way of reaching the same conclusion. Section 7 shows how reflecting on agency and practical reasoning offers a common thread between the models of φ‎-ownership and ψ‎-ownership discussed earlier in the paper.

Keywords:   Ownership, Schizophrenia, Agency, Depersonalization, A-location/B-location

MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.