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While many commentators have pointed to the lack of compassion and empathy in medicine, their critiques, for the most part, have not considered seriously the deeper philosophical, psychological, and ontological reasons why clinicians and medical students might choose to conceive of medicine as an endeavor concerned solely with the biological workings of the body. Thus, this book examines why it is that existential suffering tends to be overlooked in medical practice and education, as well as the ways in which contemporary medical epistemology and pedagogy not only perpetuate but are indeed shaped by the human tendency to flee from the reality of death and vulnerability. It also explores how students and doctors perceive medicine, including what it means to be a doctor and what responsibilities doctors have toward addressing existential suffering. Contending that the being of the physician is constituted by the other who calls out to her in his suffering, this book argues that the doctor is, in fact, called to attend to suffering that extends beyond the biological. It also discusses how future physicians might be “brought back to themselves” and oriented toward a deeper sense of care through a pedagogy that encourages intentional reflection and values the cultivation of the self, openness to vulnerability, and a fuller conception of what it means to be a healer.

This book launches a spirited attack on a system that is profoundly entrenched in our society and its institutions, deeply rooted in our emotions, and vigorously defended by philosophers from ancient times to the present. The book argues that, despite the creative defenses of it by contemporary thinkers, moral responsibility cannot survive in our naturalistic-scientific system. The scientific understanding of human behavior and the causes that shape human character, it contends, leaves no room for moral responsibility. The book argues that moral responsibility in all its forms—including criminal justice, distributive justice, and all claims of just deserts—is fundamentally unfair and harmful and that its abolition will be liberating and beneficial. What we really want—natural human free will, moral judgments, meaningful human relationships, creative abilities—would survive and flourish without moral responsibility. In the course of this argument, the book examines the origins of the basic belief in moral responsibility, proposes a naturalistic understanding of free will, offers a detailed argument against moral responsibility and critiques arguments in favor of it, gives a general account of what a world without moral responsibility would look like, and examines the social and psychological aspects of abolishing moral responsibility. It not only mounts a vigorous attack on the moral responsibility system, but also celebrates the benefits that would result from its total abolition.

In Disturbed Consciousness, philosophers and other scholars examine various psychopathologies in light of specific philosophical theories of consciousness. The contributing authors—some of them discussing or defending their own theoretical work—consider not only how a theory of consciousness can account for a specific psychopathological condition but also how the characteristics of a psychopathology might challenge such a theory. Thus one essay defends the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness against the charge that it cannot account for somatoparaphrenia (a delusion in which one denies ownership of a limb). Another essay argues that various attempts to explain away such anomalies within subjective theories of consciousness fail. Other essays consider such topics as the application of a model of unified consciousness to cases of brain bisection and dissociative identity disorder; prefrontal and parietal underconnectivity in autism and other psychopathologies; self-deception and the self-model theory of subjectivity; schizophrenia and the vehicle theory of consciousness; and a shift in emphasis away from an internal (or brainbound) approach to psychopathology to an interactive one. Each essay offers a distinctive perspective from the intersection of philosophy, consciousness research, and psychiatry.

This collection of original essays, comments, and replies brings together philosophers and scientists to discuss the relevance of recent neuroscience and psychology to traditional debates about free will and moral responsibility. These prominent authors clearly show that free will and moral responsibility raise many issues that need to be distinguished, and none of them can be addressed adequately without both philosophy and science. Various chapters concern whether free will requires rationality, whether responsibility is fundamentally social, whether the origins of actions in the brain depend on stochastic processes, whether mental states can cause bodily movements, whether free will requires dualism, whether control is enough by itself for responsibility, whether addicts and monkeys have free will, and how social groups shape people's views on free will and moral responsibility. These lively exchanges among well-known experts are a model of fruitful interdisciplinary exchange. This collection will be useful in undergraduate and graduate classes and will interest anyone who is intellectually curious.

The ethics in this book is unique. It is not about philosophy’s moral theories and principles and their logical application. That standard conception of ethics is too simple, too spare, too abstract, and ultimately too impersonal. Real moral problems are complex, contextual, and dynamic. They need to be framed, examined, and settled, and these constructions, analyses, and resolutions need to be rational. The normativity of this novel conception of ethics is embedded in judgment, which is ubiquitous in our lives, and good judgment emanates from rational processes of deliberation, that is, the ones that have been well designed. This book is about non-formal reason, a conception of rationality that subsumes formal reason, both logic -- deducing what ought to be done from moral principles -- and calculating optimal net benefits among options, but it is a more expansive, more creative conception of rationality. Re-reasoning ethics is about designing rational processes of deliberation that produce rational judgments in ethics and bioethics, as well as other domains such as science and our lives. In ethics it marks problem solving as deliberative design for human flourishing. This conception of ethics is unusual because it is grounded in the empirical realities of human beings and their worlds, and its naturalism takes rationality to be an empirical learnable, improvable deliberative skill. Given this orientation, the examples offered are real and drawn from anthropology and sociology. The ethics of this book is about the best that finite, fallible human beings can do and should do.

Sexbots are coming. Given the pace of technological advances, it is inevitable that realistic robots specifically designed for people’s sexual gratification will be developed in the not-too-distant future. Despite popular culture’s fascination with the topic, and the emergence of the much-publicized Campaign Against Sex Robots, there has been little academic research on the social, philosophical, moral, and legal implications of robot sex. This book fills the gap, offering perspectives from philosophy, psychology, religious studies, economics, and law on the possible future of robot-human sexual relationships. Contributors discuss what a sex robot is, if they exist, why we should take the issue seriously, and what it means to “have sex” with a robot. They make the case for developing sex robots, arguing for their beneficial nature, and the case against it, on religious and moral grounds; they consider the subject from the robot’s perspective, addressing such issues as consent and agency; and they ask whether it is possible for a human to form a mutually satisfying, loving relationship with a robot. Finally, they speculate about the future of human-robot sexual interaction, considering the social acceptability of sex robots and the possible effect on society. Contributors include: Marina Adshade, Thomas Arnold, Julie Carpenter, John Danaher, Brian Earp, Lily Eva Frank, Joshua Goldstein, Michael Hauskeller, Noreen Herzfeld, Neil McArthur, Mark Migotti, Sven Nyholm, Ezio di Nucci, Steve Petersen, Anders Sandberg, Matthias Scheutz, Litska Strikwerda, Nicole Wyatt

Belief in moral responsibility is very strong; and although there are many arguments in support of moral responsibility, it is clear that those arguments are not as strong as the belief in moral responsibility, and other forces must be supporting that strong belief. The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility examines the various forces that hold the moral responsibility system in place, both in philosophy and in criminal justice. The major elements of the moral responsibility system include belief in a just world, belief in rugged individualism (and self-making), and belief that moral responsibility protects human dignity. Together, those factors block deeper inquiry into the causes of character and behavior, and the insistence on limiting deeper inquiry is fundamental to preserving belief in moral responsibility. The neoliberal culture promotes strong belief in a just world (including belief in a just economic system) as well as belief in the “self-made man,” and that culture is also the most deeply committed to individual moral responsibility.