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Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism$
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David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262012560

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012560.001.0001

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Physicalism without Pop-out

Physicalism without Pop-out

(p.243) 11 Physicalism without Pop-out
Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism

Philip Pettit

The MIT Press

This chapter focuses on a general problem that must be confronted by physicalism. This is that even if such a physicalism is true, it is not going to be very satisfying in a range of important cases. The problem is looked at here in a more general and systematic manner; although we may be in a position to believe that the psychological is a priori derivable from the physical, so that the presence of this or that psychological phenomenon is a priori derivable from how things physically are, we are very unlikely to be in a position to conduct a derivation or even to get a sense of how it would go. It is argued here that we suffer from a derivational deficiency that takes away from the satisfaction that derivations generally give us.

Keywords:   physicalism, psychological phenomenon, derivation, derivational deficiency, a priori derivable

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