This chapter aims to demonstrate that various normative claims concerning rationality can be derived from matters of fact. It can be argued that unless one is a realist about possible worlds, claims about them other than the actual are not really descriptive claims at all, but, rather, are just disguised modal claims. Modal semantics is not a main issue here; it is merely presented since it demonstrates how quick we are to think of modal claims as being of a quite different kind from nonmodal claims, and a case can be made that this is mistaken. Once one looks for the right kind of nonmodal facts, the apparent gap between modal facts and nonmodal facts disappears. It is argued in this chapter that it is the same case with claims about rationality.
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