Moral Functionalism, Ethical Quasi-Relativism, and the Canberra Plan
Moral Functionalism, Ethical Quasi-Relativism, and the Canberra Plan
This chapter presents a double agenda, the topics of which share a complementary nature. The first agendum is to shed light on some issues relating to the “Canberra Plan,” while focusing not on generic issues but on matters specific to the distinctively evaluative and normative domain of ethics. The second agendum is to promote a view referred to as quasi-relativism. Here Frank Jackson’s version of “moral functionalism,” is discussed, especially as it is set out in his work From Metaphysics to Ethics. The chapter looks at Jackson’s views and considers a variety of issues that are relevant. According to this chapter, the view expressed here emerges naturally if one takes a paradigmatically “Canberra Plan” view such as Jackson’s, acknowledges certain problems for it, and revises the view accordingly.
Keywords: normative domain of ethics, Canberra Plan, quasi-relativism, Frank Jackson, moral functionalism
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