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Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism$
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David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262012560

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012560.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 27 January 2022

The Argument from Revelation

The Argument from Revelation

(p.113) 5 The Argument from Revelation
Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism

Daniel Stoljar

The MIT Press

This chapter presents a take on the doctrine of revelation. Arguments from revelation are set out, after which, David Lewis’s response to this argument, together with related responses, is discussed. The “Canberra Plan,” at least in philosophy, is constitutively connected to compromise; it is often used for philosophical projects involving a compromise or replacement conception of some of the central notions both of philosophy and of ordinary life. Compromise usually stems from a commitment to a general metaphysical thesis about the nature of the world, namely, physicalism—a view that is inconsistent with intuitively plausible claims about the nature of apparently existing things. This chapter concludes by going back to the Canberra Plan and seeing what the reflections here have revealed about it.

Keywords:   doctrine of revelation, David Lewis, Canberra Plan, compromise, replacement conception, nature of the world, physicalism

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