Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262012560

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012560.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 27 January 2022

Is Semantics in the Plan?

Is Semantics in the Plan?

(p.183) 8 Is Semantics in the Plan?
Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism

Peter Menzies

Huw Price

The MIT Press

This chapter focuses on the role and place of semantic notions such as reference, satisfaction, and truth in the Canberra program, and in its distinguished Lewisian parent. Notions such as reference and satisfaction appear to play crucial roles in Lewis’s development of the Ramsey–Carnap technique. However, it is arguable that these uses are eliminable, in a sense familiar from discussions of the pros and cons of deflationary approaches to truth and reference. If this is the case, Lewis’s own program is compatible with semantic deflationism, at least at this point. In view of the importance of Lewis’s program, and the popularity of deflationism, this is a significant conclusion. On the other hand, the “globalization” of Lewis’s technique envisaged by Jackson requires that semantic notions play the role played by causation in Lewis’s original. If this is the case, the global program becomes incompatible with semantic deflationism.

Keywords:   semantic notions, reference, satisfaction, truth, Canberra program, Lewis, Ramsey–Carnap technique, deflationism, Jackson

MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.