Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Consciousness RevisitedMaterialism without Phenomenal Concepts$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Michael Tye

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262012737

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM MIT PRESS SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.mitpress.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright The MIT Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in MITSO for personal use.date: 04 March 2021



(p.xi) Introduction
Consciousness Revisited

Michael Tye

The MIT Press

This book is primarily aimed at showing that “the phenomenal-concept strategy” for defending materialism is a flawed strategy. This strategy posits that we are possessors of a range of concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences—concepts very different in how they function from concepts applied elsewhere. These concepts permit us to think of our experiences in a first-person, subjective way even though the aspects of our experiences about which we so think are, in reality, purely material or physical entities. It is argued here, however, that phenomenal concepts, as materialists typically suppose them to be, simply do not exist. There is nothing inherently special about the concepts whereby we form a conception of what it is like for us subjectively.

Keywords:   phenomenal-concept strategy, materialism, experiences, subjective aspects, phenomenal concepts, materialists

MIT Press Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs, and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us.