The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience
The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience
The purpose of this chapter is to take a close look at the nature of perceptual content. It begins with a description of naive realism, which is a good enough starting point for further theorizing about the nature of perception. A number of disjunctivists, however, posit that we need to suppose that the objects we perceive are components of the contents of our perceptual experiences in veridical cases. A related consideration is that in cases of illusion, the perceived object appears other than it is, in which case the perceptual experience is intuitively inaccurate. The discussion here is necessary for at least two reasons. First, it is needed to defend some claims made about visual content in Chapter 1. Second, a proper understanding of visual content is essential to understanding the position developed in the next chapter and applied thereafter.
Keywords: perceptual content, naive realism, nature of perception, disjunctivists, perceptual experiences, veridical cases, illusion, visual content
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