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Consciousness RevisitedMaterialism without Phenomenal Concepts$
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Michael Tye

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262012737

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.001.0001

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Consciousness, Seeing, and Knowing

Consciousness, Seeing, and Knowing

(p.95) 5 Consciousness, Seeing, and Knowing
Consciousness Revisited

Michael Tye

The MIT Press

This chapter discusses how we see the world and the things around us; it shows how we commonly use the term “see” with respect to objects and with respect to facts. Some have argued that there is a distinction between this way of seeing and another way of seeing that things are thus-and-so. To see a thing, it suffices that the thing appears in some way to the perceiver; and something can look in some way without the perceiver’s noticing that it is that way and thus without the perceiver’s seeing that it is that way. The general point here is that one can see an object O without there being any property P such that one sees that O has P, or without there being any property P such that one sees with respect to O that it has P. These points about seeing and seeing-that, as is argued here, apply to knowing and knowing-that.

Keywords:   way of seeing, perceiver, objects, facts, seeing, seeing-that, knowing, knowing-that

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