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Consciousness RevisitedMaterialism without Phenomenal Concepts$
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Michael Tye

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780262012737

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.001.0001

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Privileged Access, Phenomenal Character, and Externalism

Privileged Access, Phenomenal Character, and Externalism

(p.183) 8 Privileged Access, Phenomenal Character, and Externalism
Consciousness Revisited

Michael Tye

The MIT Press

This chapter begins with an exploration of how one can be conscious of what it is like to undergo a certain experience. It seems that there is some sense in which one could not be wrong at all about the phenomenal character of that experience. This notion is particularly urgent since the earlier rejection of phenomenal concepts made here allows for significant error with respect to the beliefs formed about phenomenal character via introspection. The purposes of this chapter are to explain why and how error is impossible with respect to phenomenal character and to show how the position elucidated here not only is fully compatible with the view adopted in Chapter 3 on concepts but also does not lead to social externalism concerning phenomenal character. Some general remarks about phenomenal character and externalism are also put forth here.

Keywords:   phenomenal character, experience, phenomenal concepts, introspection, error, social externalism

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