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Consciousness Revisited – Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts - MIT Press Scholarship Online
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Consciousness Revisited: Materialism without Phenomenal Concepts

Michael Tye


We are material beings in a material world, but we are also beings who have experiences and feelings. How can these subjective states be just a matter of matter? To defend materialism, philosophical materialists have formulated what is sometimes called “the phenomenal-concept strategy,” which holds that we possess a range of special concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences. This book argues that the strategy is mistaken. A rejection of phenomenal concepts leaves the materialist with the task of finding some other strategy for defending materialism. The book points to ... More

Keywords: material beings, material world, subjective states, materialism, phenomenal-concept strategy, consciousness, thought experiment, zombies, perceptual content, change blindness

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2008 Print ISBN-13: 9780262012737
Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013 DOI:10.7551/mitpress/9780262012737.001.0001


Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Michael Tye, author