Introduction
Introduction
This book proposes a novel view of free will and links the problem of free will and determinism to a straightforward (and wide-open) empirical question about the causal histories of certain neural events. In this chapter, the problem of free will is formulated and a few brief remarks about libertarianism are provided, along with a discussion of compatibilism. The chapter then provides an outline of the book, which explores why the compatibilism and conceptual-analysis issues are metaphysically irrelevant, why the libertarian question reduces to the issue of indeterminacy, and why there are no good arguments for or against determinism (or any other thesis that would support or reject libertarianism).
Keywords: free will, determinism, neural events, libertarianism, compatibilism, indeterminacy
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