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Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem$
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Mark Balaguer

Print publication date: 2009

Print ISBN-13: 9780262013543

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262013543.001.0001

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Why the Libertarian Question Reduces to the Issue of Indeterminacy

Why the Libertarian Question Reduces to the Issue of Indeterminacy

(p.65) 3 Why the Libertarian Question Reduces to the Issue of Indeterminacy
Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem

Mark Balaguer

The MIT Press

Libertarianism, the view that human beings possess L-freedom, is considered untenable by many philosophers. This chapter shows that libertarianism is virtually entailed by the appropriate kind of indeterminacy and argues that indeterminacy increases or procures the appropriate nonrandomness. In making this argument, it assumes that some form of mind-brain materialism is true and that all causation is ordinary event causation. The chapter demonstrates that the question of whether libertarianism is true reduces to a straightforward empirical question about the causal histories of the neural events which are our torn decisions. Finally, it shows why TDW-indeterminism increases or procures authorship and control.

Keywords:   libertarianism, L-freedom, indeterminacy, causation, neural events, torn decisions, authorship, control, TDW-indeterminism, materialism

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