Color within an Internalist Framework: The Role of “Color” in the Structure of the Perceptual System
Color within an Internalist Framework: The Role of “Color” in the Structure of the Perceptual System
This chapter presents two distinct but related ideas that characterize commonsense conceptions of perception. The first one claims that perception works as it appears to us, immediately suggesting explanatory useful categorizations of phenomena. The second idea, on the other hand, is a realistic conception of perception in the sense of a naive realism. Attempts to provide some kind of philosophical justification for the realism underlying commonsense conceptions of perception tend to agree with the idea of color per se. The intuitions ensuing from these two ideas, and how they have influenced systematic inquiries of perception, are also discussed here. Perception is an entirely conspicuous process; common sense is willing to except all sorts of sophistications and exceptions to this view, but it otherwise regards this account as a kind of truism.
Keywords: perception, commonsense conceptions, categorizations of phenomena, naive realism, color per se, systematic inquiries of perception, truism
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