In Defense of Extended Functionalism
In Defense of Extended Functionalism
This chapter aims to clarify the relationship between the extended cognition hypothesis (ExC) and functionalism, and to defend extended functionalism against three of its strongest criticisms. ExC claims that there are conditions under which thinking and thoughts are spatially distributed over the brain, body, and world in such a way that the external factors concerned are rightly accorded cognitive status. It is concerned mainly with the whereabouts of thinking and thoughts that is separate not only from the position adopted by orthodox cognitive science, but also from the position adopted by any embodied-embedded account of mind. Adams and Aizawa have repeatedly emphasized the insufficiency of thoughts being spatially distributed over brain, body, and world solely in the sense that applies when some instance of intelligent behavior is discovered to be causally dependent on the bodily exploitation of certain external props. The chapter concludes with a brief remark on extended functionalism and phenomenal consciousness.
Keywords: extended cognition hypothesis, ExC, extended functionalism, cognitive status, orthodox cognitive science, Adams, Aizawa, phenomenal consciousness
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