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The Extended Mind$
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Richard Menary

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014038

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.001.0001

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Consciousness, Broadly Construed

Consciousness, Broadly Construed

(p.271) 12 Consciousness, Broadly Construed
The Extended Mind

Mark Rowlands

The MIT Press

This chapter begins with a presentation of Frege’s reflections on the concept of sense and how it has been misread as leading to a philosophy based on psychologism. This is helpful because the focus of this chapter is based on the psychological—specifically, conscious experiences defined by there being something it is like to have them. An extended account of states that are both conscious and intentional is also discussed, claiming that the intentional directedness of experiences consists in disclosing activity, and that this disclosing activity typically involves neural processes, bodily processes, and things done in and to the world. This intentional directedness is used to argue the point for an extended model of conscious experience.

Keywords:   concept of sense, Frege, psychologism, conscious experiences, directedness of experiences, neural processes, bodily processes, extended model of conscious experience

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