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The Extended Mind$
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Richard Menary

Print publication date: 2010

Print ISBN-13: 9780262014038

Published to MIT Press Scholarship Online: August 2013

DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.001.0001

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Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist

Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist

(p.167) 8 Meaning Making and the Mind of the Externalist
The Extended Mind

Robert A. Wilson

The MIT Press

This chapter focuses on the “problem of intentionality” and how it affects the naturalistic view of the mind. The problem of intentionality is threefold: the concept of intentionality needed an explanation, there needed to be a delineation between objects with intentionality and those without, and an explanation was required on why objects had a particular type of intentionality. Of these tasks, the third is the core one, since it is important to specify in virtue of what certain things in the world are about the particular things they are about. Intentionality also inevitably divides the world into objects with intentionality and objects without it. From this dichotomy can be derived that intentionality of language derives from that of thinking, since two of the objects that possess intentionality are language and thought.

Keywords:   problem of intentionality, naturalistic view of the mind, intentionality of language, dichotomy, type of intentionality

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