Introduction: Framing Knowledge and Skepticism
Introduction: Framing Knowledge and Skepticism
The first few chapters of this book concern the intrinsic and extrinsic nature of knowledge. Here David Hemp provides a defense of Dretske’s claim that when knowledge is based on evidence, this evidence must be conclusive. He discusses a variety of puzzles about knowledge as well as some notable contextualist solutions to them. The second set of chapters specifically concerns the prospects for contextualism, wherein Duncan Pritchard marshals a linguistic defense of the invariantist use of WAMs against DeRose’s challenge. In particular, he contends that the invariantist can identify a WAM that meets DeRose’s three pragmatic conditions. Finally, the last set of chapters pushes procedural knowledge into the background and focuses on propositional knowledge. In particular, knowledge is carved according to its causal modes, specifically perception, introspection, and reason.
Keywords: knowledge, David Hemp, Dretske, contextualism, Duncan Pritchard, invariantist, WAM, DeRose, procedural knowledge, propositional knowledge
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